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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
there arose a rebuttable presumption or inference that the truck in-
volved in the accident belonged to the one whose name and markings
it carried and also that it was being operated on his business at the
time of the collision. The decision is in accord with the Restate-
ment.
16
FLETCHER R. ANDREWS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OBSCENITY LAWS
Obscenity generated judicial opinions in 1956,' 1957,2 and 1958.3
In 1959, sex again reared its ugly head in Ohio constitutional law
decisions. In laymen's language, the law continues to have difficulty
with pictures of nude or partially disrobed women in publications,
especially when stories of sex acts or crimes accompany these pictures.
Reported last year were decisions of cases arising in Cleveland and
Cincinnati. In the former city, a druggist was indicted4 under the
Ohio criminal code5 for knowingly possessing an obscene magazine
and for knowingly exhibiting a certain magazine which contained
obscene pictures. A demurrer to the indictment was overruled. The
court severed the exhibiting count from the possessing count because
the former did not meet the United States Supreme Court require-
ment delineated in Roth v. United States6 - the periodical must be
taken as a whole to judge its obscene character. The count based
upon knowingly possessing obscene printed matter withstood constitu-
tional objections raised in the areas of due process, free press, in-
violability of private property, and equal protection. The last point
was urged as a basis for holding druggists exempt from the obscenity
provisions.7 The court held that no such special privilege existed.
A municipal ordinance6 was involved in the Cincinnati case.9 The
charge was having possession of, or control over, obscene printed
matter. Magazines with photographs of nude females, with such
accompanying stories as using hypnosis to improve husband-wife sex
relations, methods by which a woman can protect herself from sex
attacks, and a rape of an expectant mother were placed in evidence.
A psychologist testified as an expert on the effect of such material on
the average mind; a police officer, with considerable experience in
combatting juvenile delinquency and vice, offered evidence of the ef-
fect of such publications on young delinquents and sex deviates. The
conviction was affirmed because the publication was obscene under
the Roth test: to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme, taken as a whole, appeals to
prurient interests.
16. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 595(2) (1934).
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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1959
In December 1959, however, the United States Supreme Court
appears to have banned convictions under facts such as were present
in this Cincinnati case. Smith v. People of California0 reversed a
municipal conviction under an ordinance requiring only possession of
obscene material for criminal liability. No proof of the bookseller's
scienter or "knowingly possessing" the publication was required by
the ordinance. This was held unconstitutional under the provision
for liberty of press and speech awarded by the United States Consti-
tution."
THE USE TAX AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The Ohio Supreme Court was called upon to apply the interstate
commerce clause last year. The Ohio use tax 2 was held to be con-
stitutionally applied to radio transmitting equipment purchased out
of state, and shipped into Ohio where it was installed within several
days to be used principally for interstate transmission. The tax was
viewed as being applicable to all personal property which comes to
rest in Ohio, without resulting in discrimination or burdening com-
merce among the states.3
EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS
Equal protection and due process issues continue to be of concern
in litigation. It was held that a city ordinance which taxed water and
sewer rental bills fifty per cent for general revenue purposes did not
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
However, such an ordinance did violate Ohio statutes,-' which forbid
the transfer of water and sewer funds to the general fund.'5
The statutes which exclude corporations and new resident owners
from signing or opposing an annexation petition were held not to be
1. Schroeder, Constitutional Law, Survey of Ohio Law - 1956, 8 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 275,
278 (1957).
2. Schroeder, Constitutional Law, Survey of Ohio Law - 1957, 9 WEsT. REs. L. REV. 275
(1958).
3. Schroeder, Constitutional Law, Survey of Ohio Law - 1958, 10 WEsT. REs. L. REV. 359
(1959).
4. State v. Kowan, 156 N.E2d 170 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
5. OHIo REv. CODE §§ 2905.34-.35.
6. 354 U.. 476 (1957).
7. OHIo REv. CODE § 2905.37.
8. CINCNNATI, OHIO, CODE § 901-43 (1956).
9. City of Cincinnati v. King, 159 N.E.2d 767 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
10. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
11. Id. at 150.
12. OHIo REv. CODE § 5741.02.
13. Tri City Broadcasting Co. v. Bowers, 169 Ohio St. 126, 158 N.E.2d 203 (1959).
14. Omo Rnv. CODE §5 729.52, 743.05-.06.
15. City of Franklin v. Harrison, 160 N.E.2d 15 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
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a denial of equal protection or due process. 16 Even when the General
Assembly enacts two statutes, both labeled section 5519.02, and both
appearing in the Ohio Revised Code, the law is not so vague as to
violate due process.'1
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
Delegation of legislative authority to administrative officers is
constantly an issue in state constitutional cases. Two decisions up-
held the validity of state statutes in this area. To grant the Board
of Tax Appeals the power to promulgate rules for the assessment of
property for tax valuation so as to achieve uniformity, to avoid over-
evaluation, and to bar discrimination was held constitutional.' Fur-
thermore, article XII, section 2 of the Ohio Constitution, providing
a maximum tax of one per cent on property, was not violated. The
creation by statute 9 of the Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority was
also held valid. No illegal delegation occurred, and no tax levy for
private purpose, no use of public funds for private purpose, no appro-
priation of private property for private use, and no lending of public
credit for private companies (all prohibited by the state constitu-
tion)20 existed.2' However, the General Assembly did illegally dele-
gate its authority when it authorized the Division of Parks to make
and enforce rules to control water craft on lakes.22 The rules pro-
mulgated prohibited and punished a person who repeatedly changed
direction of such a craft without a substantial reduction of speed,
except to avoid a hazard. The court held that article II, section 1
implies that criminal legislation must be promulgated by act of the
legislature, not by administrative order.3
POLICE POWER
The issue of state police power arose in two cases. An ordinance
prohibited the practice of peddlers' going onto private property with-
out the owner's invitation, and declared such act to be a nuisance.24
The state statute permits licensing of transient dealers. 25  However,
it was held that it is unconstitutional to forbid such dealers entirely,
by ordinance.
26
16. Chedwell v. Cain, 169 Ohio St. 425, 160 N.E.2d 239 (1959).
17. Thormyer v. Dueber Realty Inc., 158 N.E.2d 924 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
18. Carney v. Board of Tax Appeals, 169 Ohio St. 445, 160 N.E.2d 275 (1959).
19. OHIO REV. CODE ch. 4582.
20. OHIO CONST. art. 8, § 6.
21. State ex rel. McElroy v. Baren, 169 Ohio St. 439, 160 N.E.2d 10 (1959).
22. OHIO REV. CODE § 1541.11.
23. State v. Pairan, 159 N.E.2d 829 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
24. Washington, Ohio, Ordinance 383, April 13, 1938.
25. OHIO REv. CODE § 715.64.
26. City of Washington v. Thompson, 160 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1959
A municipal ordinance 7 prohibited a private electric utility from
erecting overhead transmission lines to carry over 33,000 volts. The
utility sought to use such lines to carry 132,000 volts, as it had done
in many other localities. The requirement that such lines be under-
ground was held to be a reasonable exercise of the police power.2
The three dissenting judges29 relied upon the rule of an earlier case,30
that to be a valid exercise, the police power must tend in some sub-
stantial degree to prevent offenses or preserve health and safety. If
there be no plausible, reasonable, and substantial connection between
the legislation and the supposed evils, no authority exists to enact the
legislation. The dissent relied heavily on the fact findings of the
special master. Automatic cut-offs operated within 1/20th of a sec-
ond to shut off the 132,000 volts. In the 1953 tornado in Cleveland,
none of these 132,000 volt lines were blown down. Thirty years of
records indicated no such accident. Only nine times did any accidents
occur, and they were caused by vandalism and an airplane collision.
The only person ever injured was the aviator. These high voltage
lines exist at 877 street crossings in other nearby municipalities. To
the dissenting judges, undisputed evidence on record revealed no sub-
stantial connection between the alleged evil of falling lines and the
underground requirement.
ZONING
Land use and zoning are current municipal problems. The Ohio
Supreme Court held that mandamus will lie to compel the issuance of
a building permit for a supermarket- on a parcel of land which had a
parcel with similar zoning on one side, but parcels with less restrictive
zoning on the other three sides. The court said that to require this
parcel to be used in accordance with the more restrictive zoning
would prohibit its use in harmony with the needs and nature of the
neighborhood. Further, this requirement would be confiscation and
a violation of the due process clause.31  When a municipality gives a
permit to operate an automatic laundry store, and it is not classified
as a non-conforming use, no vested right exists to operate seven days
a week, twenty-four hours a day. No contract, just a special privi-
lege, has been granted. The Sabbath dosing law can be enforced.3 2
27. Euclid, Ohio, Ordinance 288-1956, Dec. 3, 1956.
28. State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. City of Euclid, 169 Ohio St. 476, 159
N.E.2d 756 (1959). See also discussion in Municipal Corporations section, p. 408 infra.
29. Id. at 483, 159 N.E.2d at 762 (dissenting opinion).
30. City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 49 N.E.2d 412 (1943).
31. State ex rel. Killeen Realty Co. v. City of East Cleveland, 169 Ohio St. 375, 160 N.E.2d
1 (1959). See also discussion in Administrative Law and Procedure section, p. 338 supra.
32. State ex rel. 12501 Superior Corp. v. City of East Cleveland, 158 N.E.2d 565 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1959). See also discussion in Administrative Law and Procedure section, p. 339 supra.
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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Procedural due process was discussed twice last year. One case
held that it would be a violation of due process to deny plaintiff's
motion to dismiss a lawsuit without prejudice when defendant had
not concluded putting in his evidence and had not rested. Plaintiff,
too, had not waived rebuttal and thus had not rested. Under Ohio
Revised Code section 2323.05 (A), no leave of court is required in
this situation and to deviate from the express provisions of trial
procedure would be unconstitutional.3 3  A dissenting judge34 con-
tended that the case had already been submitted at the end of plain-
tiff's case when defendant moved for judgment, so plaintiff must get
leave to dismiss without prejudice.
Another case held that a municipality need not be provided a hear-
ing before the state director of highways before he issues a resolution
declaring the necessity of relocating a federal aid highway in the
city. 3  The legislature provided the procedure to be followed by the
administrative officer to determine where to re-route the highway.36
The municipality has the right to appeal this determination to the
court through a trial de novo.37 This procedure was deemed to sat-
isfy procedural due process. Furthermore, this was not an unlawful
delegation of legislative authority, nor did it violate the requirement
of uniform operation of general laws.
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A number of special issues involving Ohio constitutional provi-
sions were reported in 1959. The General Assembly improperly en-
acted legislation providing for a constitutional amendment to be voted
on at the general election. The bill was not timely entered in the
journals of the House and Senate, as required by article XVI, section
1 of the Ohio Constitution. Therefore, the Secretary of State was
enjoined from advertising the proposed amendment .3  Two dissent-
ing judges3 9 viewed the constitutional clause as not being self-execut-
ing and contended that both houses of the assembly had kept true
journals under Ohio Revised Code section 101.61, which was a valid
enactment.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that mandamus will lie to require
the Board of Elections to arrange names on a general election ballot
by group, under the office title, as required in article V, section 2 (a)
33. Glassmeyer v. Glassmeyer, 155 N.E.2d 702 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
34. Id. at 706 (dissenting opinion).
35. City of Lakewood v. Thormyer, 154 N.E.2d 777 (Ohio C.P. 1958). See also discussion
in Administrative Law and Procedure section, p. 330 supra.
36. OHIO REV. CODE § 5521.01.
37. City of Lakewood v. Thormyer, 154 N.E.2d 777, 786 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
38. Wichterman v. Brown, 170 Ohio St. 25, 161 N.E.2d 899 (1959).
39. Id. at 29, 161 N.E.2d at 903 (dissenting opinion).
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